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Abstract 
 
This paper analyses, from an institutionalist perspective, the emergence, nature and 
ways in which Parliamentary “scientific and technological advice” activities are carried 
out in different European countries. We argue that the connection of Technology 
Assessment (TA) with the political process can only be understood if this type of 
information resource is regarded not only as an input in the decision-making process but 
also as a legitimising mechanism. Some local pre-conditions are important for the 
emergence of these practices, as well as the existence of some political entrepreneurs 
willing to advance the initiatives within their respective political systems. 
 
Two different models of arrangements of Parliamentary TA are identified, the  
instrumental and the discursive one. The adaptation, consolidation and differential 
impact of these information production practices are mediated by two factors: the 
capacity of PTA organisations to gain support both inside and outside the Legislature, 
and their capacity to access decision-makers in an environment of competition with 
other organisations that also produce TA. The two models have both types of these 
capacities in differing degrees. It is argued that differences in impact are to be analysed 
in the context of the rules of the political game and the types of incentives that TA 
organisations face. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
This paper addresses the relations between scientific knowledge and politics, and more 
specifically the role of knowledge and information about highly technical issues in 
politics. The connection between science and politics, the relationship between 
Government (the executive) and science (Smith, 1992) has been studied at certain 
length, from the viewpoint both of science as a system that demands funds and 
resources (Cozzens and Woodhouse, 1995), and of the role that scientists and experts 
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play as advisors in the political process (Barker and Peters 1993; Bimber and Guston 
1995), both to presidents (Bromley, 1995), bureaucrats (Jasanoff, 1990) and even to the 
judicial system (Jasanoff, 1995). Some steps have also been taken to gauge the impact 
of scientific advice (The IPTS Report, 2001; The IPTS Report, 2003). 
 
Fewer studies have focused on the relationship between science and the legislature, 
between scientific knowledge and parliamentary decisions, with the exception of the 
literature on the US Congress, and specifically the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA) (Gibbons and Gwin, 1988; Bimber, 1996; Bimber and Guston, 1997). However, 
it is also true that there is a steadily growing array of literature on the provision of 
scientific and technical (S&T) advice to Parliaments in Europe (Vig and Paschen, 
2000), and on the demand and use of technical information by the US state legislatures 
(Jones, Guston and Branscomb, 1996). 
 
The aim of this paper is twofold: First of all, to analyse the emergence, nature and way 
in which Parliamentary “scientific advice” activities are carried out in different 
European countries, especially when that advice is provided through a specific practice 
called "Technology Assessment (TA)" and through organizational forms of production of 
this knowledge that, albeit differing, are known as Parliamentary Offices of Technology 
Assessment (POTA), and provide a service to Parliament, either as their only customer 
or as a special customer. Secondly, to outline the similarities and the differences in the 
organization of these POTA and, from an institutionalist perspective, to analyse and 
explain the diverse impacts of these organizations' S&T advice or TA activities. 
 
Analysis of this specific knowledge production instrument known as technology 
assessment (TA) has been heavily dominated by normative approaches, which have 
even been characterized as various paradigms of TA (van Eijndhoven, 1997), and 
methodological approaches (Porter, 1980; Kuhlman et al, 1999; VV.AA. 2000), which 
underscored its values as a practice associated to the design of science and technology 
policies (Smits, Leyten & Den Hertog, 1995) or to the forging of stronger ties between 
science and society (Rip, Misa & Schot, 1996). 
 
As for TA's connection with politics, many authors have analysed the political process 
that led to the creation of the OTA, the first Parliamentary technology assessment 
organization, its subsequent operation and the causes of its demise (Bimber, 1996); 
others papers have focused on the influence that social and cultural factors have had on 
the dominant form adopted by POTAs in several European countries (Petermann, 2000) 
or on the institutional aspects of their establishment (Vig, 2000), but most of the studies 
describe how the different POTAs are run (Paschen, 2000; Kluver, 2000; Laurent, 2000; 
Norton, 2000; etc.) 
 
In our opinion, the nature of these unique information production practices and their 
emergence are phenomena that can only be understood within their institutional context. 
Our contribution places the institutions, the rules of the political game and the types of 
incentives that TA organizations face, at the heart of the explanation for their 
adaptation, consolidation and differential impact, pointing out the contradictions that 
sometimes exist between the institutional arrangements and the relative impact of the 
TA produced by the organizations linked to Parliaments. We argue that the institutional 
arrangements that govern POTAs are key factors for explaining the depth and extension 
of the impact of their TA activities; therefore, if one wants to understand TA's impact in 
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the political and social process, one must first understand and characterize the 
institutional context in which it takes place. 
 
Our analysis is constructed upon the comparative method (Collier, 1993), albeit in 
circumstances determined by a small number of cases (n small). The argument will be 
contrasted empirically with a set of cases from several countries that have created 
“Parliamentary scientific advice” institutions, analysing their institutional arrangements, 
as well as the type of TA that they perform and its impact. The information has been 
collated from questionnaires and interviews conducted with the people in charge of 
these organizations. The impact is gauged on the basis of the role description and the 
typology of possible impacts drawn up by the TAMI team. 
 
In section two, and since history has a bearing on understanding the present (Rose & 
Davies, 1994), we take a brief look at the emergence and consolidation of TA as a 
practice that produces information about S&T matters, oriented and linked to the 
political process, specifically to Parliament. In order to explain the emergence of TA, in 
section three we put forward a theory regarding the use of scientific advice and 
information in Parliament and in policy making in general. To this end, we adopt a 
hypothesis that complements the traditional rationalist model of "information" as input 
in the decision-making process, and also regard information as a mechanism for 
legitimising decisions and as an instrument in power struggles. Section three puts 
forward an analytical structure for understanding how TA has emerged in different 
degrees as a practice with its own identity in several countries and, above all, for 
explaining the reasons why TA is or is not adopted in its parliamentary form, i.e., linked 
to the political process, and what types of arrangements are established. Section four 
analyses the institutional arrangements and organizational structures in which TA 
occurs in the Parliaments of some European countries, and to do so defines and 
characterizes two models or types of arrangements governing TA as the practice of 
producing information for the political process: the instrumental model and the 
discursive model. Section five explains the types of impacts and their relationship with 
the diverse institutional arrangements existing in the POTAs. Some empirical evidence 
is then used to establish general descriptive and normative hypotheses. Lastly, section 
six, presents some conclusions. 
 
 
2. The emergence of TA as a specific cognitive and information 
practice 
 
In this section we characterize the concept of technology assessment (TA), that unique 
variety of production of information or “policy advice” related to S&T matters. To that 
end we take a historical approach, describing the emergence and creation of TA as an 
information-production practice, with its own identity and special ties to the political 
process, as the outcome of a specific juncture in the United States, in which it attained a 
high degree of institutionalisation. 
 
Broadly speaking, TA has been defined as the production of information about the 
possible consequences of S&T developments to improve public policies. More 
specifically, we regard TA as a type of information about highly scientific or 
technological problems that tends to come in written form, in documents or reports, and 
that is developed to "improve the information for policy-making"; in a few evolved 
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forms, TA also seeks to foster debate, public understanding or acceptance of the impacts 
of science and technology from a neutral, non partisan position, always using scientific 
information of the best possible quality1.  
 
In the United States, the ever growing importance of science, not only because it 
demands resources from our societies, but also as a core element of political decision-
making, gained relevance in 1957, after Eisenhower created the post of the President's 
Science Advisor and the “President’s Science Advisory Committee” (PSAC) (Killian, 
1977). 
 
By the mid-Sixties, US society harboured a growing concern about the negative side 
effects, in environmental or health risk terms, of the development of certain 
technologies (for example, nuclear technology or pesticides, which won their 
discoverers the Nobel Prize of Chemistry). This prompted a movement to reassess 
technological developments, and even led to a literary best seller in the shape of Rachel 
Carson’s book Silent Spring (1962). 
 
Civil society, especially the scientific community, sponsored the development and 
production of information, based on the best scientific evidence available, about the 
"polemical" aspects of scientific and development technological. The goal was to offer 
policy makers insight that would help them to make decisions about impact-relevant 
projects. Broadly speaking, the analyses, originally sponsored by the research facilities, 
were designed to provide advice about scientifically relevant issues and, in short, to 
influence political decisions. What one might call “grass roots TA”, or what Van 
Eijndhoven (1997) labelled “classical TA”, developed in the Sixties, especially in 
wealthy countries such as the United States, and peaked when it expanded its 
boundaries and merged with politics. In October 1972, the United States Congress 
decided to set up a specialized internal agency, the Office of Technology Assessment 
(OTA), stating that “the basic function of the Office shall be to provide early indications 
of the beneficial and adverse impact of the applications of technology and to develop 
other coordinant information which may assist Congress” (92nd Congress, 13 October 
1972, Public Law 92-484) (quoted by Holt, 1977). 
 
The creation of the OTA should be seen in the light of the effect of those concerns about 
technology’s negative impacts, or the technological optimism that has been the hallmark 
of US bureaucracy; yet it is also essential to place it in the right political context. The 
United States is a political system marked by a “divided government”. It should also be 
seen in the light of the effort that Congress made, at the start of the Seventies, to bolster 
its position vis-à-vis the executive (Bimber, 1996). Thus, the two key factors behind 
that unique event were: the aim to reinforce the scientific and technical information 
available to parliamentary decision-makers with non-partisan, unbiased information, of 
the best scientific quality available and, secondly, the aim to bolster Congress' power 
vis-à-vis the executive, an institutional effort that is also to be observed in the creation 
or the reinforcement in those years of other Congressional agencies (Sundquist, 1981). 
The OTA, whose creation was initially sponsored by the Democrats and triggered 
certain distrust among the Republicans, finally managed to earn itself a reputation as an 
                                                 
1 TA has been applied frequently in areas such as transportation, energy policy, bioethics, GMOs, 
consumer regulations, waste policy, environmental policy, etc. See, for example, the history of the OTA 
in its reports (OTA, 1996). 
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agency that provided non-partisan advice, in order to improve decision-making within 
Congress. 
 
The OTA and its activities managed to afford "technology assessment" an identity, as 
information based on scientific and technical knowledge, but different from scientific 
knowledge strictu senso and from the information produced by Washington’s think 
tanks or interest groups, and geared towards offering neutral advice to Congressional 
policy-makers.  Further on we look at the explanatory significance of the impact caused 
by the fact that an internal, instrumental model for producing information and advice on 
scientific matters for public policy, such as the OTA, arose within the institutional 
framework of a divided political system, with a clear separation of powers between the 
executive and the legislature, in which legislative power has been traditionally 
decentralized in the Committees and Subcommittees (Polsby 1968; Cooper & Brady, 
1981; Polsby & Schickler, 2002). It is against this political background of 
decentralization where an internal instrumental model has the strongest capacity to 
influence political decisions, even in the absence of strong external ties. However, the 
same circumstances that allowed the OTA to enjoy extraordinary resources, and 
therefore facilitated its impact, were no guarantee for its survival when the political 
conditions changed radically in 1995. 
 
Therefore the first successful example of TA as a practice in a political context can be 
explained by circumstantial and local reasons. However, this activity, which took place 
with political institutionality in the United States, and its experiences contributed to 
afford TA an international identity. From that moment on, the OTA and TA model 
became available for rational imitation (Hedström, 1998), international policy transfer 
(Wolman, 1992), or inspiration in the context of drawing lessons for policy (Rose, 
1991). So to understand why the same type of TA was developed and adopted in other 
countries' political systems, as well as thinking about local preconditions, one must pay 
attention to other issues such as the international diffussion of models and policy ideas, 
or the emergence of an epistemic community around TA as a practice.  
 
The next section explains how the diffussion or imitation of, and inspiration in the OTA 
model were influential factors in the development of parliamentary TA in Europe; 
however, it seems evident that today TA is not a significant source of information in 
guiding technology policy throughout the world. The reason for this perhaps lies in the 
general nature of its method of work, subject to the political processes of conflict and 
agreement; or perhaps in the fact that it has not incorporated or constructed a “policy 
paradigm” (Heclo, 1974) or has been unable to form an “epistemic community” (Haas, 
1992) in which the producers of policy ideas and policy makers share the same model 
and goals; or, perhaps, in the fact that there are countless sources of information that 
compete for the “limited attention” of political organizations' decision-makers. 
 
 
3. The diffusion/adoption of TA in different national contexts 
 
If the traceable origins of both the grass roots and institutionalised versions of TA are to 
be found in the United States, then two questions remain to be answered: first of all, 
why has TA developed as a type of unique S&T information, with its own identity, in 
some societies, but not in others?  Secondly, why was TA adopted in its parliamentary 
form? Why were Parliamentary Offices of TA set up in some European countries? 
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This section puts forward an analytical structure for understanding the emergence of TA 
as a specific practice of information production on S&T policy matters in the different 
European countries, and also outlines the factors that explain why some countries adopt 
the parliamentary form of TA while others do not, and the types of arrangements that 
are established.  
 
To answer these questions about TA (there are always some type of similar practices), 
we must distinguish between two levels of analysis: the analysis of the emergence of 
TA in general produced by different groups, and the analysis of TA's ties with politics. 
First of all we will analyse the general conditions in which the supply (the producers) of 
this type of information arises and, then examine the social construction of demand 
from the political system and its institutionalisation. 
 
In the cases we examine, there seems to be a sequence in which the supply of TA or a 
form of quasi-TA arises first and is then followed in time by demand, in a context of 
political processes where drawing on other countries' experiences and recently the 
activism of the European Parliamentary Technology Assessment (EPTA) network seem 
to be key factors. 
 
Until now, no clear answer has been found to the first question, because most of the 
case studies conducted have a selection bias and only analyse countries where these 
organizations have indeed developed, and/or also in which TA has been linked to the 
Parliamentary scientific advisory process. One might suppose that the US precedent 
spread, leading others to imitate and drawn upon the OTA’s experience, yet the almost 
total absence of TA in some countries seems to indicate that this information production 
practice only emerges if certain prerequisites are met.  
 
After analysing the cases in which TA has developed in general and where the groups 
that produce TA have flourished, we can put forward a general explanation associated to 
the importance of local preconditions. Three macro social factors serve to explain the 
relative abundance of this type of practices, and the consolidation of groups or 
organizations in the general panorama of socio-politically oriented "scientific and 
advisory" institutions: first of all, the country's level or degree of S&T development, 
measured by the percentage spending relative to GDP or by the number of researchers 
per person in employment; secondly, the existence of a problem of "public perception of 
science" (whether negative or positive) in each of the countries, and a certain balance 
between the "hope and fear" that the technological developments generate; lastly, in 
some countries the civic and participatory nature of democracy matters, insofar as TA is 
generally a grass roots movement. 
 
In short, one could say that this unique type of information, TA, can only exist if there 
is already a certain level of S&T development in those societies, where the scientific 
community is concerned about the social responsibility of science, and also where the 
new social movements such as environmentalism have been politically relevant. TA is 
the normal outcome of the existence of a "rich" scientific system, where research 
facilities have surplus capacities and abundant manpower because, generally speaking, 
the first people to practice TA are the very same scientists who, for different reasons, try 
to influence the course of political decisions. 
 
 7
Therefore, TA can emerge –and as a matter of fact has emerged– regardless of the 
context within which it is used; in theory it can emerge even without any explicit 
demand from the political system. However, experience shows that the organizational 
density of the ecology of countries’ TA and S&T policy analysis centres is a good 
predictor of the emergence of the political system’s demand2. 
 
With low levels of S&T development, there is little opportunity to make decisions about 
scientific matters, yet at the same time without democracy, which is also closely 
associated with economic growth (Przeworski et al, 2000), and without a civic culture, 
the road to decisions about public policies is closed to practices such as TA. 
 
Hence TA is a special type of "policy analysis and advice" produced by scientists, or 
heavily influenced by scientific method; yet to gain acceptance it must compete –and try 
to coexist- with many other sources of information that politicians, governments, 
bureaucrats or parliaments use. As a practice mainly of the academic community, or of 
social movements, TA has had to compete with other information, because there are 
many other sources that produce information about "the possible outcomes of 
technological options": the experts who work in or for the government, regulatory 
agencies, bureaucrats, think tanks, interest groups, etc.  
 
In our countries, there are plenty of sources of S&T related information that can inform 
public decisions, and that seek to influence them; one might say that the different 
organizations that produce information and "advice" on political matters, many of which 
relate to S&T, compete with one another, and that when one of them emerges, there is a 
greater likelihood that more will appear, though perhaps less of a likelihood only one of 
them being used by socio-political actors. 
 
One form of S&T information production quite similar to TA –and perhaps with shared 
roots-, but that has normative powers and the authority to impose sanctions is the one 
that has emerged in the two last decades in the "regulatory agencies", which are 
unquestionably specialized competitors of other TA organizations’; this “variety of TA” 
has developed under the executive, especially in the technology related regulatory 
agencies, albeit sometimes with institutional arrangements that tie them to the 
legislature, as occurs with the Spanish Nuclear Safety Council; however, in these cases, 
even if the production of S&T information is guaranteed to have an impact, its quality 
or independence has varied greatly. The missions have been clearly defined and 
specialized, as in the case of the agencies responsible for nuclear safety, evaluating 
drugs or environmental technologies and, more recently, health technologies. These 
regulatory agencies have built up such highly specialized S&T capabilities that, in most 
of the countries, they enjoy a quasi-monopoly in their respective fields over the 
knowledge about the aspects or problems associated to those technologies. In fact, 
regulatory agencies could be said to have spread as a result of the pressure exerted by 
social actors and the technical "rationality" being imposed in the settling of conflicts. 
 
If the development of regulatory agencies with very strong S&T powers in traditional 
TA fields such as the nuclear industry, the environment, etc, that report to the executive, 
has not hindered the growth of demand for TA by the Parliaments, perhaps it is because 
Parliaments have helped to institutionalise TA and afford it an identity as an 
                                                 
2 A brief look at the database of TA institutions in the world seems to confirm this argument. 
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information production practice and a generalist methodology. Furthermore, it is worth 
assessing whether the development of these regulatory agencies is likely to threaten the 
survival of POTAs. 
 
So it seems that there is something about TA, its method, and how its identity has been 
built that makes it especially prone to being connected with Parliaments, to the 
institutionalisation of its relations with the legislature. That is why the second part of 
this section analyses the development and institutionalisation of several varieties of TA 
linked to the political system, and more specifically to Parliaments, and not with just a 
symbolic or rhetoric, but substantive nature in those countries that had met the 
prerequisites. The concepts that are used to argue this bond (demand) have to do with 
the legitimation of decisions, with power, more specifically with the distribution of 
power. 
 
As we have said, TA, insofar as an information production and awareness practice, 
became established and acquired its own identity in association to the political system, 
perhaps due to the impact of the experience of the US Congress OTA and its subsequent 
international diffusion, and with the intention of influencing public policies with a high 
S&T content. Understanding this bond involves adding an alternative hypothesis to the 
traditional rationalist model, which regards “information” as input in the decision-
making process, so that information is also regarded as a decision-legitimising 
mechanism. Organization theorists have long known that organizations have and 
demand a lot more information than is actually used in decision-making processes. That 
is why they say that "having the information" is quite often a legitimation mechanism, 
rather than an aid for making decisions (Feldman and March, 1981), decisions that are 
usually made applying rules different to those imagined for decision-makers endowed 
with "Olympic rationality" (Simon, 1983). 
 
In this context, the volume of information from different sources, and sometimes linked 
to specific groups and interests, means that decision-makers can be faced with a lack of 
legitimacy, and thus claim that they do not have any neutral, independent information. 
To understand this, one should remember that the TA produced by the organizations 
linked to the Parliaments in the different countries, is only one of the "types of 
information products" related to decision-making that is available, but what is special 
about it is that this information is produced institutionally in the Parliament, at the 
request of Parliamentary bodies, and that parliamentarians may have influenced when 
and how it was produced, giving it a "owner" identity. 
 
With such a proliferation of alternatives sources of policy analysis production, the 
recipients may become saturated, and the mass availability of information from interest 
groups can also lead to politicians wishing to receive "neutral" information, a wish that 
can be satisfied by an independent organisation. As true as it may be that, if the impact 
is the power to influence, that power is inversely proportional to the existence of 
alternatives sources for achieving the same information resource (Emerson, 1962), at 
the same time, if the need for neutral information is essential in order for politicians to 
claim legitimacy, then it is just as relevant to argue that decision-makers' attention 
capacity is limited, and that any channel of direct access to them, with the right timing, 
is a major organizational asset. This latter case includes the POTAs. 
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What is specific about Parliament-linked TA, as part of its identity, are the "neutral", 
"independent" and "non partisan" values of the information produced, values built on 
traditional Mertonian scientific exceptionalism. It is in this context that the claim 
regarding the "scientific" nature, due both to the method and its significance, of the 
information produced through TA, becomes all the more relevant, because it implies the 
use of the legitimacy derived from the scientific knowledge in the political and 
parliamentary process. Furthermore, despite the legitimising functionality of the 
information, parliamentarians and experts must build up a relationship based on trust. 
 
Having already found a functional explanation, namely the legitimacy, for the 
connection between TA, and other types of information, with the political process, 
another question that remains to be answered relates to the emergence of POTAs in 
Europe: are they the result of the international diffusion of that political innovation, 
based on imitation or on any other concept? Or alternately, can POTAs be said to have 
emerged and emerge as the result of socio-political preconditions?3  
 
Looking at the dates on which the European POTAs were created (and actually began 
operating), one finds a certain process of “international diffusion” or imitation of this 
US local innovation, namely the OTA. Innovation diffusion processes have had a long 
tradition of study (Coleman et al, 1957; Coleman, 1966; Rogers, 1962/95); scholars 
have studied the international diffusion of organizational models and norms (Meyer and 
Hannan, 1979; Meyer et al, 1992; Finnemore, 1996), the diffusion of political 
innovations within the political system (Polsby, 1984; Walker, 1969; Berry and Berry, 
1990) or on an international scale (Wolman, 1992; Rose, 1991; Majone 1991).  
 
Rose (1991) spoke of 5 different ways of drawing lessons from other countries' 
experiences, albeit while referring to public policy programmes: 1) copying; 2) 
emulation; 3) hybridisation; 4) synthesis; 5) inspiration. This last model often occurs 
when political decision-makers travel and, upon seeing a familiar problem in an 
unfamiliar environment, they expand the ideas of what is possible, etc. There is little 
doubt that the OTA and other subsequent experiences, thanks to the information 
exchange mechanisms in place between the legislatures (for example, the Inter-
Parliamentary Unions, etc.) were a source of inspiration for tackling the problems 
identified by the European parliaments and, by resemblance, shed light on easier paths 
forward thanks to the solutions that others had adopted beforehand. In the European 
case, apart from national activism, one cannot forget the European Commission's 
initiatives, such as the FAST programme, which at the start of the 80's contributed to 
open up a Europe-wide debate, in the context of the European Technology Assessment 
Conferences, which began in 1987 in Netherlands  (Smits, 1987). 
 
Yet while the simple diffusion model may well be valid, the fact is that other 
preconditions are necessary for the diffusion of political innovations. We have already 
said that socio-economic preconditions explain first the level of development of TA in 
general. However, despite being necessary, these conditions do not suffice for TA to be 
linked to the political process in Parliaments. There also have to be political 
entrepreneurs (Schneider, Teske & Miltrom, 1995) willing to push forward the initiative 
in a context in which either they want to strengthen Parliament's position vis-à-vis the 
executive, or else foster participatory models that involve a better informed citizenry.  
                                                 
3 The problem has already been addressed in literature from the methodological viewpoint and is known 
as Galton's problem. 
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According to Kingdon (1984/95), the policy process is formed by 3 different streams: 
the problem stream (there is a problem involving information or asymmetry of power), 
the solution stream (here the existence of models of other countries from which to draw 
inspiration is crucial) and the stream of the political juncture that prompts political 
entrepreneurs to match problems with solutions. In other words, the political 
entrepreneurs, from the institutions, “will bring the solution”, in the form of POTAs, for 
the problems that they perceive to exist in the Parliaments.  
 
An analysis of the individual cases shows that political entrepreneurs were essential in 
the institutionalisation of POTAs, because they managed to overcome the reluctance of 
the Parliaments and their majorities, most of whom were little inclined to the 
experiment, given the nature of continental political-parliamentarian systems. In short, 
promoting this type of Offices in European Parliaments should be accepted 
institutionally as a mechanism for “reinforcing” Parliament’s position with respect to 
the executive, with respect to the Government of the parliamentary majority party or 
parties. Therefore, the creation of these organizations was only politically feasible if 
there was a consensus. The POTAs developed and became consolidated in Europe, 
although under no circumstances on the same scale as the OTA, as was to be expected 
in Parliaments that lacked the US Congress' enormous powers. The nature of the 
European political system, in which Parliaments serve to support the Governments, 
meant that most POTAs had to "be authorised" by the latter (Denmark was the 
exception because the opposition majority in the Parliament imposed its opinion upon a 
minority Government) and, therefore, may have been a "concession" or an exchange 
with others, or a gesture of commitment to the democratic institutions.  
 
In this section we have shown that the development of TA supply and the political 
construction of demand are two different processes. When TA began to form part of 
European Parliaments, the OTA's experience began to become known internationally, 
but only when some political entrepreneurs took it upon themselves to combine the 
“problems” identified in the Parliaments of overdependence on the bureaucrats', 
government's and lobbies' information, with solutions adopted in other environments. 
Indeed, one of the reasons mentioned most often for creating these POTA is not so 
much to sift the executive's information, but rather as a means of defence against the 
avalanche of information from the lobbies. That is why the POTAs' success and survival 
hinges on their capacity to respond to the incentives of their customers and others who 
request their information appropriately, in an institutional manner, building a 
relationship of trust with legislators that serves the key goal of legitimising decisions. 
 
 
4. Institutional arrangements for TA in Parliaments: Dominant models 
and adaptive strategies 
 
This section outlines the institutional arrangements that connect TA with politics and 
specifically with the Parliaments in some European countries. The analysis of 
institutional arrangements has traditionally sought to distinguish between: a) the 
conditions in existence when these institutions are created (at whose initiative, in what 
circumstances, how, etc.), that let the political entrepreneurs play an active role, and in 
which the constitutional rules are established and b) the effects of these constitutional 
arrangements on the incentives and opportunities structure to which that actors respond 
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during normal operation of the institutions, and as a result of which they develop 
adaptive strategies that maximise their survival and influence. In line with this 
distinction, in this section first we will analyse the origin of POTAs in Europe, then 
analyse two predominant organizational models, and lastly compare the importance of 
two fundamental dynamics in the adaptation processes and impact of these 
organizations in institutional contexts marked by the centralization of political power: 
on the one hand, the development by the Parliaments of a sense of ownership of the 
POTAs’ information that gives the latter the edge over other producers of S&T related 
information, and secondly, the construction of support coalitions by these organizations. 
 
4.1. Origins 
 
Following the expansion of the idea to provide Parliament with S&T advisory functions, 
and after several failed attempts to imitate the American model -for example, in the 
German Parliament at the end of the Seventies and start of the Eighties-, from the mid-
Eighties onwards, Europe began to witness certain successful initiatives, sponsored 
either by the government, on its own or on Parliament's initiative, or by Parliament 
itself, to set up different mechanisms designed to provide Parliament with an S&T 
advisory service. 
 
It seems that the decision to start up these mechanisms, devised either solely to support 
Parliamentary or with a complementary mission, and the adoption of the constitutional 
model, essentially have to do with the nature of the country's political system, with the 
type of specific government-parliament relations, and above all with the civic traditions 
of civil society and how open the political elites are. The volume of means and 
resources with which the support mechanism is endowed, in other words, its 
organizational capacities to carry out the TA mission, unquestionably mirrors the 
Parliament's desire to assert itself (especially if it is an exclusive service) vis-à-vis the 
executive, a circumstance that existed in the case of the OTA, which at one time had a 
200 people staff. As we have said already, the presence of political entrepreneurs who 
act as catalysts in the right circumstances is essential to success. 
 
In most of the cases studied, it was Parliament who took the “initiative”, although in a 
few cases it was the Government who provided the solution (see table 1). In France, the 
United Kingdom, Germany, the European Parliament and even Denmark, it was 
Parliament who rubber-stamped the initiative and supplied the resources. In France, the 
early creation of the OPECST seems to have been a by-product of the demands for the 
democratisation of French society that spurred the left wing's electoral success and the 
Mitterrand Presidency (Laurent, 2000). As for the British Parliament, the POST arose 
after several MPs sponsored and demanded the creation of a TA office, which was 
private during the trial phase and subsequently institutionalised within Parliament 
(Norton, 2000). In the case of the European Parliament, the demands made by a 
powerful Standing Committee were resolved internally by setting up a Parliamentary 
support unit within the European bureaucracy (Holdsworth, 2000). In the Danish 
Parliament, it was the majority opposition that forced the Government to create it 
(Kluver, 2000). In these cases, and in others such as Germany (Paschen, 2000) or 
Flanders, broadly speaking there was a favourable political juncture that enabled the 
respective parliaments to bolster their position with respect to the government or 
technocrats, but in our opinion the core variable is the sense of identity and reliability of 
one's own source of information production that the model of parliamentary support 
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mechanisms created to compete not only with the government sources of information, 
but above all with the lobbies' sources.  
 
Table 1.- Institutions and offices providing scientific advice and Technology Assessment 
(TA) to some European Parliaments 
Country Acronym Name English translation Year of 
creation-
operation 
Denmark DBT Teknologi-rådet The Danish Board of 
Technology 
1986 
European Union STOA Scientific and 
Technological Options 
Assessment at European 
Parliament 
Scientific and 
Technological Options 
Assessment  
1985-88 
Flanders region viWTA Samenleving en 
Technologie 
Flemish Institute for 
Science and 
Technology 
Assessment 
2000-2 
France OPECST Office Parlementaire d' 
Evalutation des Choix 
Scientifiques et 
Technologiques 
Parliamentary Office 
for Evaluation of 
Scientific and 
Technological Options 
1983-85 
Germany TAB Büro für Technikfolgen-
Abschätzung beim 
Deutschen Bundestag 
Office of Technology 
Assessment at the 
German Parliament 
1990 
Switzerland TA-
SWISS 
Centre d'évaluation des 
choix technologiques 
Zentrum für 
Technologiefolgen-
Abschätzung 
Centre for Technology 
Assessment (CTA) at 
the Swiss Science and 
Technology Council 
1991 
The Netherlands Rathenau Rathenau Instituut Rathenau Institute 
(former NOTA) 
1986 
United Kingdom POST Parliamentary Office of 
Science and Technology 
Parliamentary Office of 
Science and 
Technology 
1986-89 
Source: Own elaboration 
 
In other cases the initiative, or at least the solution to the provision of the service, 
stemmed from government. The cases of Netherlands (van Eijndhovern, 2000) and 
Switzerland, although in the latter case the mechanism was created upon a joint 
initiative, represent a way of responding either to the demands of Parliament, which for 
constitutional reasons cannot create any new body (the case of Denmark), or to 
parliamentarians' demands for information and advice on S&T matters.  
 
Given the nature of European political systems and relations between the executive and 
the legislature, in both cases the creation of the POTAs entailed the majority 
Government (except in the said cases of minority Governments such as Denmark) 
accepting or tolerating a limited experiment in giving Parliament a service that could be 
"used by the opposition". The political conditions that enabled these mid-80's initiatives 
to succeed in Europe underscore the importance of local and contingent elements; when 
it arose in Europe -unlike what occurred in the US in the Sixties-, it triggered a "hope" 
that technology would enable companies to become more competitive, and therefore 
what some have called the classic paradigm of TA (Van Eijndhoven, 1997), which 
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focused on the "early anticipation of adverse consequences", lost ground in Europe to 
other models such as the attempts to adapt the OTA paradigm, which focused on 
clarifying options and the provision of S&T advice, basically geared to Parliament 
(France, UK, Germany, European Parliament), or to models that emphasised the 
democratic control of technological developments and broader grass-roots involvement 
in decision-making (Netherlands, Denmark). Whatever the case, one of the key reasons 
behind the promotion of TA and POTAs in Europe is a hope that technology can further 
contribute to enhancing people's living conditions and boosting competitiveness, and 
perhaps that is why it is more closely connected to the policy process, albeit in a 
relatively marginal place such as Parliament. 
 
It must be underscored that not all the initiatives to create parliamentary information 
and advice mechanisms were successful. In fact the difficulties involved in going 
beyond rhetoric and creating real and effective mechanisms, still persist in some of the 
POTAs that were equipped with scant resources, just as Parliaments are poorly 
equipped in comparison to the executives. Certain initiatives failed, albeit on a 
temporary basis, one example being the case of Germany, whose first initiatives date 
back to the mid-Seventies, the proposal having been explicitly rejected in 1982. Others, 
such as the 1989 proposal to set up a POTA in the Spanish Parliament, (Quintanilla, 
1989) failed to get off the ground when early elections were called and the policy 
entrepreneurs changed. The causes, which are closely linked to parliamentary and 
political life, refer to the specific parliamentary sessions during which the initiatives 
were put forward; the fact that some MPs leave office whenever the political cycle 
changes means that sometimes these initiatives have failed, but also that they can be put 
forward again.  
 
Attention should also be drawn to the contingency of POTAs, and of TA centres, in 
Europe. The same political dynamics that created the conditions for TA's 
institutionalisation may have created the conditions for its demise4 (Bimber, 1996). 
These cases go to show that if POTAs' opportunities of emerging hinged on political 
factors, such as the institutional reinforcement of Parliament vis-à-vis the Executive, 
and the will to make TA part and parcel of parliamentary life, their chances of survival 
are conditioned by the local adaptive strategies that they adopt. 
 
4.2. The models in their political context 
 
Despite the extraordinary variety of institutional arrangements that govern how POTAs 
are run, a functional analysis will show that there are two main models (Petermann, 
2000), in terms of their relationship with Parliament, that reflect the key mission/s of 
each case: instrumental and discursive. The instrumental model (which could have 
applied to the defunct OTA) includes the POTAs whose chief (or only) customer are the 
respective Parliaments or their Committees. This is the case of POST, TAB, STOA, 
viWTA and OPECST; more recently, similar initiatives have been launched in countries 
such as Italy and Greece, but they are less active. The discursive model applies to the 
countries that have a long-standing civic tradition and have asked the TA institutes not 
only to contribute to "enlighten" parliamentarians' (and even the government's) 
decision-making processes, but also to help their respective societies to foster a social 
                                                 
4 The issue is an important one, due to the government decision to cease funding the Baden-Württemberg 
Centre for Technology Assessment in 2003, or the pressures that the Danish Board of Technology has had 
to put up with since a conservative majority coalition took office, for the first time in many years 
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debate about the acceptability of technologies. This second type of organization, whose 
customers are not limited to Parliaments, include the DBT, Ratheneau, and TA Swiss. 
The three agencies' remits include the possibility of also advising their respective 
governments. 
 
Broadly speaking, the political systems in which these European POTAs operate are 
characterized by a more formal than actual separation of powers, so the legislature and 
the executive tend to overlap, and in fact many ministers are also members of 
parliament. They are also characterized by a strong degree of party discipline in the 
parliamentary arena. Similarly, one finds a considerable degree of concentration of 
legislative initiatives within the government or the executive. Furthermore, 
Parliamentary Committees usually mirror the distribution of power of the respective 
Parliaments, and their role tends to be limited to preparing and drafting legislation, 
while the Plenary Session has the last word. All these characteristics portray a context 
marked by the centralization of power, so the differences in our cases in the frequency 
with which the POTAs inform either the parliamentary committees, or individual MPs 
or the Plenary Session, might not be very relevant from the impact viewpoint.  
 
On the issue of differences, and the variables linking the political system to the POTAs' 
institutional arrangements, stable majority governments (either of one party or with very 
small coalitions) are more frequent in the United Kingdom and Germany, while 
minority and/or multiple coalition governments are more usual in Flanders, Denmark, 
Netherlands and Switzerland. It is also to be noted that interest groups' and stakeholders' 
relative capacity to influence the political system is very considerable in Flanders and 
Switzerland, strong in Netherlands, Denmark and Germany, yet more moderate in the 
United Kingdom. A political spectrum fragmented into several represented parties 
would seem to favour the emergence of discursive POTAs, insofar as one would expect 
the beneficiaries of the TA output to be widely distributed (and not concentrated) 
between the parties and society.   
 
Some empirical evidence has been gathered in order to provide a certain amount of 
information about the TA production process5. The POTAs studied face a major 
dilemma. First of all, and as far as the scope of their activities is concerned, one might 
think that generalist organizations are at an advantage to specialist organizations, which 
would have to compete with regulatory agencies and others producers of very specific 
TA. Yet at the same time, in Europe these organizations have always had very limited 
budgetary and human resources, and when resources are scant, sometimes it is better to 
specialize. Most of the cases we have studied are generalist organizations, and all 
operate in social contexts in which TA development capacities are widely distributed, so 
no single organization enjoys a monopoly of this mission. However, several of the 
POTAs work exclusively or mainly for Parliament (TAB, STOA, POST and viWTA), 
and the last three depend directly on it; whether or not this more restricted relationship 
derives in a greater impact on some of the roles, is something to be verified empirically. 
Be that as it may, STOA and POST are supervised by their respective parliaments, 
while in all the other cases, the “administrative” supervision or dependence (for core 
funding) is linked to some ministry, normally the one responsible for science-related 
matters. 
 
                                                 
5 A survey was conducted among POTAs directors, using a semi-structure questionnaire covering a 
variety of topics about the mission, way of funding, resources and external links of their offices. 
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Inside the political system, POTAs must compete with other bodies that produce 
information about scientific and technical matters. These POTA generalist organizations 
exist alongside specialist regulatory agencies or committees linked to the executive or 
the Administration, and lobbies that produce information associated to certain interests 
and which also tends to be of a more specialized than generalist nature. Despite certain 
differences existing in the size of such organizations, those we have studied have 
modest, limited resources and have in common that public funds are their main source 
of finance. 
 
POTAs tend to resort to scientific sources of information, although one should not 
underestimate the importance of non-scientific sources more related with the interest 
groups and civil society in general, especially in Netherlands, Denmark, Flanders and 
Switzerland, where their assigned missions are wider ranging. Even though it is the 
boards or councils of these organizations who decide what projects are taken on, there is 
a certain diversity in the degree of politicians' relative participation in these boards, 
which is greatest in STOA, in France, in POST and in viWTA. In all cases, the reports 
are widely distributed, although not of all these organizations have the promotion of 
social debate as part of their mission; it is in the case of Flanders, Denmark, Netherlands 
and Switzerland. 
 
Finally, it must be stressed that none of these POTAs, regardless of the differences in 
the force of their political mandate, has been given anything resembling a power of 
veto, or even the compulsory role of informing certain legislation before it is passed. 
Their mission is limited to producing information and providing advice, and therefore in 
the absence of this type of institutionalised formal powers, the capacity to extend the 
bases of their internal and external ties, i.e., of networking, becomes very important, in 
particular with a view to their consolidation. 
 
4.3. Adaptation strategies 
 
Now we shall look at the incentives and opportunities that foster the interaction between 
politicians and parliamentarians on the one hand, and the POTA and its experts on the 
other. Some concepts of the organization theory apply to the analysis of POTAs which, 
once formed, face the challenge of surviving in local political environments, and 
therefore have to adapt their strategy and behaviour to their respective environment. 
 
Very often, POTAs are initially approved for specific legislative periods, with reviews 
of the Offices' activities being scheduled beforehand, forcing these POTA to draw up 
adaptation strategies. Thus the first measure of a POTA's success is its capacity to 
develop strategies for adapting to the local political context, which enable it to survive 
and also to enhance its impact. We say adaptive success because they have survived 
reviews and also, in general, have turned into permanent parliamentary information 
production institutions. 
 
Adaptation strategies are built upon the interaction between three factors: 1) the nature 
of the information required by politicians or legislators, or of the missions assigned; 2) 
experts' strategies in meeting these demands; 3) institutional arrangements. Thus there 
are two relevant issues: firstly, the attributes of the decision-making process and of the 
role that information production plays in it and, secondly, institutional constraints. 
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Adaptation strategies are based on identifying the incentive structures to which these 
POTAs must respond (the needs of the parliamentarians who act as their "principal") 
and keeping to the mandate established in its mission6. The adaptation strategy will 
depend on the power structure and its distribution: first of all, on the power / 
subordination relations between Parliament and the Executive; secondly, on the 
centralization of power within parliament, or on its decentralization; and lastly, on the 
type of autonomy / dependence (authority) relationship between the POTA and its 
parliamentary principal. Hence the reason for this TA's preferential connection with 
Parliament can only be explained if one understands its nature as an information 
production process constrained by the political and parliamentary system's institutional 
arrangements.  
 
In European parliamentary systems, it is the Government who has the legislative 
initiative and, more often than not, parliamentary majorities serve to support 
government projects. Whatever the case, consideration must also be given to the 
parliamentarians' objectives, and their relationship with the Parliament's functions in 
relation to the Government. If the parliamentarians' essential objective is re-election, 
and this depends on their performance in their constituencies or with regard to their 
party, the tendency will be to legislate or to influence legislation; in European 
parliamentary systems, this means negotiating with the executive. Parliamentarians may 
also seek to enhance public policy, in which case the tendency to exercise the mission of 
controlling the government creates a context that is more favourable to the use of 
POTA-produced information7.  
 
One of the essential aspects of the institutional arrangements governing interaction 
between the demands for information and the POTA's capacity to supply it is the extent 
to which power within Parliament is highly centralized or, on the contrary, more 
distributed; this is essential for understanding the nature and type of relations that may 
exist between Parliaments and POTAs8.  
 
If a Parliament's regulations vest the Bureau and the House with all the powers, then the 
legislative committees have little authority and depend heavily on the political parties, 
which find it easier to control discipline in the House. For example, in the Spanish 
Parliament, the Committees act "by delegation" from the House and, actually, tend to be 
the mechanism where the legislative proposals put forward by the Government are 
implement if there is a large enough parliamentary majority. On the other end of the 
spectrum, in a European Parliament-type structure, it is essentially the Committees that 
"prefigure" the House's decision, because they prepare and hold lengthy discussions 
about the different matters on the agenda, and party discipline is very limited. 
 
When Parliaments and their committees make decisions, or when parliamentarians form 
their opinions, these are generally based on their political preferences, public opinion, 
                                                 
6 Though relations can be explored on the basis of the principal-agent relationship idea, if one goes 
beyond the metaphor, the problem is that determining who the principal is in each case entails taking for 
granted that parliamentary structures are similar. Parliament is a principal, generally represented by the 
speaker, but there may be other principals within Parliament, which is not a hierarchical body. 
7 It would be interesting to ascertain to what extent the type of specific information products provided by 
the POTAs makes it easier for parliamentarians to "legislate" or to "control"; in principle, given that TA is 
a slow process, we are inclined to think that it is more relevant in the control tasks 
8 The number of different political parties could provide an alternative explanation for the 
decentralization of power in parliament. Germany (4/5), Denmark (8), Holland (9/10). 
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the stance taken by the parties, especially those that support the Government, etc. and 
above all on the information produced by the bureaucrats who serve the Executive, and 
perhaps on the information produced by interest groups. 
 
Their success and impact depend on their adapting to the environment; but the POTA's 
model of organization will mirror the model of "centralization of power". If power is 
highly centralized (as tends to occur in European Parliaments), there are fewer chances 
of consolidating a pluralist clientele. The more power is centralized within Parliament, 
the more demand for “policy advice” is likely to become politicised, and the more likely 
it is that information will give rise to back-up information rather than debate, and the 
provision of information will tend to come from the Executive, supported by the 
parliamentary majority.  
 
Events at the OTA have shown that, of the two models described above, the 
instrumental model has the greatest impact in a relatively decentralised power structure 
marked by division. In different circumstances, and given that none of these 
organizations have been given institutional powers to veto policies, this model may 
come up against political hurdles when it attempts to really influence decisions. Even 
though it cannot be denied that having Parliament as one's only or chief customer, and a 
more specific mission, can be advantages for gaining access at the right time. 
 
The third factor associated with the structure of power and its distribution refers to a 
POTA's degree of autonomy or dependency with respect to Parliament. Despite their 
acknowledged autonomy, the instrumental POTAs’ dependence on or the "authority" of 
the legislators produces a sense of “owner identity” that in fact constrains their 
autonomy, and can manifest itself in the selection of objects for analysis. If this 
argument is taken to the extreme, sometimes it is the majority parliamentary groups 
who decide how an instrumental POTA operates. 
 
In this context, following adaptation strategies devised to strengthen POTA experts' 
autonomy and independence is limited by the distrust that this can trigger among the 
principals, who will only support the POTA insofar as, apart from being neutral, non 
partisan etc., it is instrumental to their political goals. Remaining loyal to the principal 
fosters trust and that, in theory, is the decisive factor for increasing access. 
 
However, the fact is that politicians inevitably have countless alternative sources of 
information and decision-making criteria. Besides, having only one principal, as occurs 
with instrumental POTAs, makes them extraordinarily dependent upon their 
functionality. 
 
In the case of discursive POTAs, the Parliamentary information and advice service is 
provided by organizations that are significantly more independent and autonomous. 
Having a large number of missions, i.e., principals (Parliament, the public at large, 
sometimes the Government), makes them extraordinarily more independent. The slip 
side is that, even when there is a minimum degree of neutrality, non-partisanship, etc., 
there is unquestionably less of a sense of “owner identity” regarding the TA results. 
Furthermore, these institutions' capacity allows them to manoeuvre socially in order to 
further the proposed objectives directly. 
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Theory has it that the less centralized a Parliament's power structure is, the more likely a 
POTA will be to establish itself and have an impact. By impact we mean the ability to 
have a bearing on socio-political change, or on the change in policies. So far we have 
seen how factors conditioning the distribution of power essentially constrain POTAs' 
opportunities to access and have an influence on Parliamentary decisions, and now we 
must look at a second issue, namely POTAs' capacity to manoeuvre with respect to the 
world of social and political actors outside Parliament. In institutional contexts where 
political divides and decentralization are not so common, a POTA's impact largely 
hinges on its ability to build coalitions that defend and support its information products, 
and this entails mobilizing actors outside Parliament, which is difficult and can trigger 
institutional conflicts with a POTA's principal, namely the Parliament.  
 
A large body of literature has taken the “advocacy coalition” (Sabatier, 1988) 
perspective as the theoretical framework for analysing public policies, and especially 
their changes. Some of this theory’s premises can be very useful for the subsequent 
empirical analysis of how the TA organizations' impact differs in line with the dominant 
institutional models that we have outlined. First of all, this perspective focuses on the 
relevance of S&T information in the political process and in the change of certain 
policies. Secondly, any impact on changes in policies can only be broached from a 
broad time perspective of several years. In other words, applied to our case, coalition-
building is associated to the prior institutional consolidation of the TA organizations. 
There are several reasons for this, but perhaps the most significant is that these 
organizations must be capable of gaining recognition and visibility before they set up 
networks. Thirdly, any analysis conducted to ascertain why policies change in our 
societies should not be limited to a single organization, be it governmental or of any 
other type, but to the subsystem of that policy, or what has become known as "policy 
domain". Besides, the concept of "policy domain" must be broadened to include not 
only the traditional triangle formed by the Administration, legislature and interest 
groups, but also two other categories of actors: on the one hand, the Media, academia, 
and political analysts, and on the other, the subnational and supranational levels of 
government, which sometimes give rise to innovations and disseminate ideas. 
 
Another question is the stability of the effects and their duration. Institutional 
arrangements permit different degrees of legislative change: much less so in a system 
with a strong separation of powers than in a parliamentary system. A POTA’s TA 
product or process may influence political options, but not necessarily remain in time. 
In parliamentary systems in which the majority holds most power, the majority coalition 
or party can change not only policies but even legislation many times, provided that 
they consider that this will not overly damage their electoral gains in the medium term. 
This is where the breadth of coalitions comes into play and where the apparent 
advantage of enjoying direct access to parliamentarians and the sense of owner identity 
regarding its products can become an obstacle. TA stems from and is institutionalised 
on the basis of relations between technology and society that are always complex and 
sometimes opaque; the organizations that produce TA will have an impact as long as 
there are enough actors who perceive their effects as positive, not only because they 
clarify options, but because they legitimate some of them through their evaluation. TA 
can create or change the point of view not only of politicians, but also of industry or of 
the public at large. External ties matter because the power bases that are behind the 
several options are very often external to the political system. 
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In this section we have shown that is possible to predict the evolution of POTAs or at 
least, given the institutional context, their best adaptive strategy. Straying from that 
optimum strategy can trigger conditions that jeopardise their very survival. 
Furthermore, this analysis has provided the key elements of an institutional theory 
regarding the factors that determine how TA activities are likely to impact the political 
system and society. 
 
 
5. The impact of TA in Parliament 
 
One might suppose that the impact of TA activities is the direct result of the "quality of 
information", of the "professionalism of the producers of that information", of the 
unique nature of the subject matter, or of any other intentional or simply voluntarist 
variable. Our argument, however, is that the institutional context in which TA takes 
place and the modes of organization of TA production, the interaction between 
politicians' demands and the POTAs' experts' strategies, are key factors in the general 
explanation of the levels of impact and the varieties thereof. Then we argue that the 
institutional arrangements that govern POTAs, the rules of the political game and the 
incentive structure that POTAs face, are key factors for explaining the depth and 
extension of the impact of their TA activities9, as well as their adaptation and 
consolidation. In this respect, we would emphasize the contradictions that sometimes 
exist between the institutional arrangements and the relative influence of the 
technological assessment of the organizations linked to the Parliaments. The two 
institutional properties discussed in the previous section: autonomy/dependence and 
exclusivity/non-exclusivity of the assessment for the parliaments are essential for 
understanding the diversity of impacts. 
 
We aim to construct an analysis that lets us associate the probability of a given type of 
impact (see the typology) to the dominant types of institutional arrangements (and the 
access and coalition structures that they permit or foster); however, we might also 
understand that institutional structures are "prerequisites" but do not suffice to predict 
the type of impact and the results in each specific case. This exercise does not aim to 
explain each and every one of the cases of TA reports and their impact, but basically to 
use empirical analysis to put forward a normative proposal that lets us understand the 
expected impact of TA activities, and at the same time that lets us reinforce or maximize 
the influence of its products. 
 
In the previous section we have shown that POTAs' impact is the result of the 
combination of two main variables: the first is the organizations' capacity to build broad 
support coalitions both inside and outside the legislature, and the second is their 
capacity to access decision-makers in a context of competition with other organizations 
that also produce evaluative information about technological options. Instrumental and 
discursive POTAs have both types of these capacities, in differing degrees, and this 
degree depends in turn on the institutional context, the rules of the game and the 
incentive structure within which these organizations operate. 
                                                 
9 The explanation is essentially probabilistic, because in specific circumstances, other general explanatory 
variables (political leadership, changes of political juncture, etc.) or regarding the nature of the specific 
policy domain affected by the TA, may also serve to interpret the situations. 
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It seems clear that the POTAs' degree of autonomy-dependence means that, in principle, 
the instrumental types enjoy more direct access to parliamentarians; yet at the same 
time, to avoid jeopardising their survival through disloyalties to their principals, less 
capacity to engage in building coalitions “outside” Parliament. On the flip side, the 
more discursive POTAs' direct access to parliament is more conditioned by the lack of a 
sense of "owner identity", because these institutions can work for other principals; in 
compensation, their greater autonomy enables them to foster the mobilization of support 
coalitions. 
 
If empirically the two aforementioned dimensions occurred at the same time in a certain 
type of TA organization, predicting its impact relative would be very simple and linear. 
However, this would only be imaginable in a world where politicians only cared about 
the truth and about improving public policies. In the real context of political systems 
and, in particular, of parliamentary ones, with the actual incentives and restrictions, a 
contradictory relationship exists between those two dimensions; in other words, if a 
greater capacity to build broad coalitions were associated inversely to the capacity to 
gain more direct and restricted access to legislators, a clear relationship could not be 
said to exist between a specific POTA model and a greater impact. What we argue is 
that not only can those contradictions occur, but also that the relationship is far more 
complex, and controlled by variables associated to the specific institutional 
arrangements, such as: political centralization or decentralization in the legislature, the 
relative power of the parliamentary committees, the strength of party discipline, the 
power of the political mandate given to these organizations when they are created, and 
by the dynamics by which the politicians obtain legitimacy for their decisions. In 
addition to all these variables that are external to TA organizations, there are other 
internal factors, related to these organizations' information production process, which 
have to do with organizational capacities (budgetary and human resources) that must 
also be borne in mind when analysing the impact. 
 
The coalitions’ breadth and access matter because the impact of TA, or any policy 
advice, is also conditioned by the information communication structure. That structure 
is what connects those who produce the information and those who use it or its 
customers. Be that as it may, what seems certain is that, in absolute terms, the broader 
the "coalition" of political, social and media actors, the bigger the impact of the TA 
(science-based knowledge for political use in non-academic communication formats) 
produced by specialised institutions. The greater the inclusivity in the number of actors 
(stakeholders) associated to the “technology” or to the “problem” who assimilate the 
proposal, the greater the impact10. 
 
Impacts can be classified according to the typology11 we present in table 2. We will now 
relate this with the institutional types that we have developed, in order to at least 
generate a few descriptive or normative hypotheses as to how POTAs can augment their 
impact. The implicit assumption of this typology of impacts is that they are not 
                                                 
10 Some case studies based-analysis has found that the strength of the OTA analytic process was its 
emphasis on broad participation. This practice increased the likelihood of impact by involving many of 
the actors crucial for an effective “distribution network” (Whiteman, 1997, p. 188). 
11  This typology has been developed by the research team of the project TAMI (Technology Assessment: 
between Meted and Impact) coordinated by Miltos Liakopoulos and Michael Decker, and involving most 
of the European POTAs. 
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constrained to the “change in policies”, but instead can be limited, in a gradient, to 
“raising knowledge” or “framing the problem”. It might seem that the only 
"justification" of POTAs is that they produce substantive third dimension impacts, yet 
depending on the dominant institutional arrangements, it may suffice if, with the 
"information's owner identity" it achieves impacts associated to raising knowledge or 
forming of opinions. 
 
Table 2: Typology of Impacts 
IMPACT 
DIMENSION 
 
ISSUE DIMENSION 
I.  
RAISING 
KNOWLEDGE 
 
II.  
FORMING 
ATTITUDES    
/OPINIONS 
III. 
INITIALISING 
ACTIONS 
TECHNOLOGICAL 
/SCIENTIFIC 
ASPECTS 
SCIENTIFIC 
ASSESSMENT 
a) Technical options 
assessed and made 
visible 
b) Comprehensive 
overview on 
consequences given 
AGENDA SETTING 
g) Setting the agenda in 
the political debate 
l) Stimulating public 
debate 
n) Introducing visions 
or scenarios 
NEW R&D 
POLICIES 
v) New action plan or 
initiative to further 
scrutinize the 
problem decided 
q) New orientation in 
policies established 
 
SOCIETAL 
ASPECTS 
SOCIAL MAPPING 
d) Structure of 
conflicts made 
transparent 
MEDIATION 
h) Blockade running  
i) Bridge building 
j) Self-reflecting among 
actors 
 
NEW DECISION 
MAKING 
PROCESSES 
u) New ways of 
governance 
introduced 
w) Initiative to 
intensify public debate 
taken 
POLICY ASPECTS POLICY 
ANALYSIS 
e) Policy objectives 
explored 
f) Existing policies 
assessed 
 
RE-STRUCTURING 
THE POLICY 
DEBATE 
k) Comprehensiveness 
in policies increased 
p) Policies evaluated 
through debate 
o) Democratic 
legitimisation perceived
NEW POLICIES  
r) New legislation is 
passed 
s) Policy alternatives 
filtered 
t) Innovations 
implemented 
 
Source: TAMI Report (2003), forthcoming 2004. 
 
According to this typology of impacts, POTAs can be said to have succeeded in the 
traditional mission of providing information for the political process. The review of 
their work point to a bigger impact on the roles included in the “knowledge production” 
dimension than on the other two dimensions. However, it must be added that a POTA's 
organizational age is a good predictor of a growing impact on this traditional role. 
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Conversely, we have found less of an impact on the roles included in the third 
dimension, "initialising actions", than in the other two. Therefore, in accordance with 
one of our initial hypotheses, the more constrained ties between certain POTAs and 
their respective parliaments do not seem to guarantee a bigger impact on legislation or 
on the change of policies in contexts marked by the centralization of power and control 
by majority. Perhaps the fact that the structure of Europe's parliaments is more prone to 
promoting the function of "controlling" the Government's action rather than legislation, 
explains the limited impacts, on the basis of this institutional constraint. There is no 
question that the lack of a strong political mandate, with a certain veto capacity, has 
something that do with this result. Yet this is only part of the explanation.  
 
Furthermore, the three dimensions of the impacts must be considered from a time 
perspective. In time, the organizations studied seem to have consolidated the roles 
related to the production of knowledge, as demonstrated by the hundreds of briefings, 
notes, and dozens of reports, hearings, public debates or consensus conferences. 
Nonetheless, the impact on the first dimension roles are closely linked to capacities and 
resources, in particular scientific advice and policy analysis in specific matters that 
require a high level of internal or external expertise12. The quality of these products 
depends heavily of available funding, but their impact also depends on the relative use 
that decision-makers make of alternative sources of information production. However, 
with equal resources, discursive-type POTAs may have a bigger impact on the 
knowledge production role known as “social mapping” (the role whose output is to 
outline the structure of conflicts) due to factors basically related with the process 
(method) by which the information is produced. The impact in this dimension depends 
on the sense of owner identity that politicians and parliamentarians afford this 
information, on their trust in the POTA, which is divided between institutional 
neutrality and loyalty to the latter.  
 
The importance of the time perspective is evident due to the simple fact that information 
production, as a product or process, is a precondition for influencing the opinions and 
attitudes of the actors involved, which is the second impact dimension of the typology. 
Influencing the agenda is one of the roles within this second dimension, and there are 
several ways of doing this, but one traditional one is “framing the problem”(Schön & 
Rein, 1994) or structuring the issue.  Influencing the agenda means that the decision-
makers accept that the information must be considered politically. Gaining access to 
decision-makers and attracting their attention can be a determining factor, especially 
when different sources of production of information are vying to attract politicians and 
legislators' attention. Once again, the POTAs that respond to a model in which external 
ties play an important role in the information production process, such as discursive 
POTAs, are likely to have a bigger impact on other roles of this dimension, such as 
brokering and communication between actors (breaking deadlocks in dialogue, bridge-
building) or stimulating of a debate in which the options are assessed, because they have 
access to actors other than politicians. 
 
The instances of strong political impact, which pertain to the "Initialising actions" 
dimension, are few and far between. Mention has been made of a DBT report on "food 
and genes", which sparked a political debate that led to legislation on genetically 
modified food, although the DBT interviewees acknowledge that it is very difficult to 
                                                 
12 According to some role descriptions made by TAMI, in certain areas it can be difficult to find 
competent, independent experts: e.g.: FX nuclear power, pharmacy) 
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attribute the legislation to the TA's impact, i.e., to isolate that cause. Other examples of 
outputs reviewed on “policy alternatives filtered”, are also Danish. The limited 
examples in this dimension seem to indicate that having a second dimension impact, i.e. 
the change in attitudes and opinions, can be a precondition for having an impact on 
policies and legislation. 
 
TA organizations seem to have established themselves, and have survived minor 
changes and “reviews” of their activities, in which they have received support. The 
DBT "crisis" or the recent demise of the Baden-Württemberg CTA point to the unstable 
balances that TA organizations face in the context of the political system.  
 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
Having reached this point, it is time to draw a few normative conclusions. In the context 
of today's political systems, the two types of POTA face such a dilemma about their 
future that one could say that they are not balanced systems, even if they have attained a 
certain degree of recognition and institutionalisation. The advantage of the more 
instrumental varieties, which tend to be subject to greater political authority, is that they 
have direct access to decision-makers, but the way in which the latter demand the 
information only contributes decisively to their impact when the information has a clear 
"owner identity", as compared to external, non-parliamentary sources. Developing an 
owner identity entails building up parliamentarians' political -and not just technical- 
trust in the POTAs, and that is achieved through loyalty, i.e., by POTAs limiting their 
own capacity for initiative, especially if this is not consistent with the current 
parliamentary majorities. POTAs that are overly active in promoting TA options run the 
risk of jeopardising the institution's sense of collective identity and trust; if the activism 
is or has been consistent with the parliamentary majority, the risk might occur if there is 
likely to be a change of majority that may have regarded the POTA's activism as too 
instrumental in favour of the government majority. By way of example, POST and TAB 
grew stronger during “left-wing” majorities. So forcing the impact, especially in the 
initiatives dimension, can put the organization's very survival at risk in the medium 
term. 
 
Furthermore, the more discursive POTAs, which are less instrumentalised by their 
respective parliaments, have greater scope for manoeuvring to enhance the impact of 
their TA output, because access to social actors is one of their institutionalised missions. 
They seem to have less of a direct influence on parliamentarians, in information terms, 
insofar as the sense of ownership of the information is not so intense as in the 
instrumental POTAs, although it is potentially larger due to their capacity to build social 
coalitions in the public opinion that change the political vision in a specific field. The 
risk that these POTAs may face is that they are nothing more than "independent 
institutes" that depend on the national budget and may end up paying the price of their 
autonomy and independence if their activism upsets the political preferences or interests 
of the politicians in office at a given moment. The development of discursive TA 
approaches in civil society, supported by private establishments, might be a justification 
for stopping their public support.  
 
If these organizations focused on low profile missions (as a documentation service), 
perhaps they would run less of a risk, but the impact might be marginal, because it 
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entails complete submission to political authority. If the information functions multiply, 
then maintaining it calls for technical discipline (neutrality, etc) and an institutional 
identity that can only be maintained through less autonomy and loyalty to the 
institution.  
 
If the option is to “act”, by building coalitions to enhance the impact, then there is no 
risk in the short term if they align with the “parliamentary majority”; in the medium 
term, however, a new majority can make one “pay” for institutional disloyalties. In 
short, the shift to activism entails remaining subject to the costs and benefits of the 
political alignment. 
 
The fact is that some of the best adaptation strategies that POTAs use to improve their 
chances of survival clash structurally with the desire to increase the direct impact of 
their TA activities on policy-making activities. 
 
Lastly, it is important to understand how the organization of power (the extent to which 
it is centralized) conditions the POTAs' adaptation strategy. The more concentrated 
power is, the higher the “risk of partisan policy or politicisation”, and the more likely 
they are to survive in the short term. At the same time, the more power that the (few and 
disciplined) parties and the Speaker of the House have than the Committees, the fewer 
opportunities they will have to build up broad supporting customer bases inside the 
Parliament (see table 3). 
 
Table 3.- Descriptive and normative hypotheses regarding the survival and impact of 
POTAs 
• Quality, neutrality and external communication are factors that influence the impact on all 
the aspects considered. 
• Quality depends heavily on organizational capabilities (budgetary, human, etc), and 
neutrality depends on access to sources of independent expertise. 
• The scope of communication depends on the density of the external networks (with 
academia, the Media, stakeholders, industry) that allows the autonomy to be increased. 
• The impact on some roles is closely related to the participatory information production 
processes (methods), which call for a certain density in the external networks. 
• A specific mandate and close ties with the institutions make it easier for POTAs to gain 
access to politicians, due a sense of owner identity, as opposed to competitor organizations 
• The instrumental type POTA model is related with a more specific mandate and a 
potentially more direct access 
• Capturing politicians' attention depends not only on the access but also on the extent to 
which the former see gains in terms of legitimacy for their decisions  
• The capacity of paying attention to or receiving information is conditioned by trust in the 
source, and this trust increases with the sense of identity and “exclusiveness” 
• The legitimacy of decisions is related to the scientific-technical quality of the information 
input and also with the breadth of the social base behind them (transparency). 
• In a political system marked by the centralization of power in executive, with Parliaments 
dominated by majorities or coalition governments, with little separation of powers and 
where committees mirror the distribution of power in the house, the POTAs stand the best 
chances of survival and impact if they form support coalitions that include outside actors. 
• The discursive model of POTA, with more general missions that imply more external 
relations, is more likely to be able to form such coalitions. 
• The risk of transforming either of the two models into activism is that it is subject to the 
costs and benefits of a political alignment subject to changes. 
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